IN RE:
		:
	Benjamin Ronald Crahalla,	:	No. 2 JD 99
	District Justice In and For	:
	Magisterial District 38-1-20	:

BEFORE:
	Honorable Esther R. Sylvester, P.J. Honorable Joseph V. Sweeney, Jr. Honorable Jack A. Panella Honorable Robert L. Byer Honorable James E. Russo Honorable Ralph J. Sposato Honorable Bonnie B. Leadbetter Honorable Leslie A. Miller

FILED: March 6, 2000

The Judicial Conduct Board has charged Respondent, a district justice, with disciplinary offenses which arise out of Respondent having served as chairman of a fund-raising committee for a charitable event. The Board and Respondent have waived their right to trial, and have submitted stipulations of fact in lieu of trial pursuant to C.J.D.R.P. No. 502(D)(1).

The parties have stipulated to the following facts, which we adopt as our Findings of Fact:

1. The Judicial Conduct Board ("Board") is empowered by Article V, §18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to file formal charges alleging ethical misconduct on the part of judges, justices, or justices of the peace and to present the case in support of the formal charges before the Court of Judicial Discipline.

2. District Justice Benjamin Ronald Crahalla ("Respondent") is the duly elected district justice serving Magisterial District 38-1-20 which is located in Montgomery County, and is part of the 38th Judicial District of Pennsylvania. Magisterial District 38-1-20 encompasses the Townships of Perkiomen and Lower Providence and the Boroughs of Trappe and Collegeville.

3. Respondent has continuously served as District Justice for Magisterial District 38-1-20 since January 4, 1988.

4. On or about April 22, 1999, the Respondent agreed to serve as Chairman of the Good Scout Award Dinner for the Cradle of Liberty Council of the Boy Scouts of America. The dinner was scheduled to be held at the Collegeville Inn on Tuesday, June 29, 1999 and was held on that date.

5. On or before May 17, 1999 the Respondent in his role as dinner Chairman, permitted form letters to be sent by the Council inviting persons to attend the dinner. That form letter stated:

I am delighted to announce the 1999 Good Scout Award dinner, benefiting (sic) Cradle of Liberty Council, Boy Scouts of America. Cradle of Liberty Council provides a quality family program for over 87,000 youth throughout Montgomery, Delaware and Philadelphia counties. The Good Scout Award dinner raises money to support the program in all its facets. This year's recipient of the Good Scout Award is Dr. John Strassburger, President of Ursinus College. The dinner will be held on Tuesday, June 29, 1999 at the Collegeville Inn, located at 3978 Ridge Pike in Collegeville. There will be a reception at 6:00 PM followed by dinner and an awards ceremony from 7:00 to 9:00 PM. I invite you to join me on June 29, 1999 to honor Dr. John Strassburger with the Good Scout Award. Enclosed you will find an invitation for your use. Cordially, (Signature) Benjamin R. Crahalla, District Justice Good Scout Award Chairman

This form letter also displayed, as "letterhead", a symbol of the Cradle of Liberty Council of the Boy Scouts of America along with the following text:

6. The letter was signed by the Respondent and the accompanying invitation form contained the Respondent's photograph, which he had provided to the Council, and identified him as: Benjamin R. Crahalla(,) District Justice.

7. The dinner was designed to raise funds for the Cradle of Liberty Council of the Boy Scouts of America and raised more than $15,000.00.

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of District Justices provides:

A district justice shall not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, or use or permit the use of the prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed as an officer, director or trustee of such an organization. He shall not be a speaker or the guest of honor at such an organization's public fund raising events, but he may attend such events.

Rule 11 expressly prohibits the type of conduct to which the parties have stipulated Respondent engaged. As the authors of a leading text on this subject explain, "[t]he purpose of the prohibition is to avoid the misuse of the judicial office. The rule addresses the dual fears that potential donors either may be intimidated into making contributions when solicited by a judge, or that they may expect future favors in return for their largesse. The possibility of corruption in fund-raising is remote, although not unknown. In either case, the dignity of the judiciary suffers, and, since most charitable organizations can raise funds perfectly well without the involvement of judges, a broad prohibition was deemed appropriate." Jeffrey M. Shaman, Steven Lubet, James J. Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics, 295 (3d ed. 2000). This prohibition applies with the same force to solicitations for the Boy Scouts as it does to other charitable solicitations, Id. at 297, and neither the worthiness of the cause nor the risk of actual corruption matter in the face of the absolute prohibition on such conduct by members of the judiciary.

Although, as the Board has represented in its pre-trial statement, Respondent appears to have resigned as chairman after he learned such participation was improper, the facts as stipulated and as we have found establish that Respondent is subject to discipline under Article V, §18(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Respondent's effort to withdraw from the prohibited conduct after completion of the offense might have a bearing on sanctions, but it is not a defense to liability.

We reject the views expressed in the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal by Judge Russo for several reasons.¹ These reasons are in addition to the fact that the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal raises purported defenses which Respondent (wisely in our opinion) has not chosen to advance on his own behalf.

Preliminarily, the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal is based upon concepts of criminal law. We disagree with the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal's interpretation and application of those precepts. More fundamentally, disciplinary charges are not criminal charges, and concepts of criminal law do not apply. In re Cicchetti, 697 A.2d 297, 307 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 1997) ("It is settled in Pennsylvania that judicial disciplinary proceedings are not criminal in nature...."), aff'd, ___Pa. ___, 743 A.2d 431 (2000).

To the extent criminal law concepts have any bearing, those concepts actually support our holding, rather than the view expressed by Judge Russo in the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal. The Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal argues that Respondent cannot be found culpable for violating Rule 11 in the absence of a determination that he possessed what Judge Russo and the members who join him would consider to be the requisite "mens rea." However, if this were a criminal case, the prosecution would not have to prove that Respondent acted with any greater intent than an intent to commit the act which violates the rule. 18 Pa.C.S. §302(h) ("Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or this title so provides.") The prosecution would not have to prove that Respondent intended to violate the law or to commit an unlawful act. Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 798 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when ... it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.") (citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 426 Pa. Super. 362, 627 A.2d 183, 186 (1993)).

Here, Respondent concedes that he committed the act which Rule 11 proscribes. Respondent does not contend that he acted unconsciously, involuntarily, accidentally, under duress or as the result of a mistake of fact with respect to the act itself.

Furthermore, the cases which the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal cites are distinguishable. There is nothing obscure about Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of District Justices, nor can it be argued that Respondent lacked notice of the Rules. Lack of notice of a registration ordinance is the primary issue in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), which Judge Russo cites. District justices and other judicial officers in this Commonwealth are required to know and abide by the applicable Rules governing their conduct. Furthermore, the Rules are readily accessible and not so numerous as to make a presumption of "notice" unfair.

Contrary to the implication of the Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal, the prohibition of charitable fund-raising by judicial officers is well known by members of the judiciary, as evidenced by the large number of advisory opinions which judicial officers have requested on this subject. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Steven Lubet, James J. Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics, 296 (3d ed. 2000). "[I]t is clear that judges are aware of the ethical restrictions on fund raising, and are not hesitant to seek guidance on the issue." Id. Thus, the notion that the prohibition of Rule 11 should be treated as some sort of obscure regulation instead of something which should be within the common knowledge of members of the judiciary is one which we strongly reject, particularly because of what that notion inaccurately implies about the level of awareness by members of the Pennsylvania judiciary concerning the ethical requirements applicable to them.

In any event, this is not a criminal case, but a judicial disciplinary case. Judicial disciplinary cases from across the country hold that the offending judicial officer need only have the intent to commit the act in question unless further intent is expressly required by the rule. See, e.g., In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585, 592-593, 382 A.2d 215, 219 (1977) (judge disciplined for accepting discounted advertising rates) ("There are many cases censuring or otherwise penalizing judges for conduct otherwise legal and noncriminal. Good faith may be taken into account on disposition, but is no bar to a finding of the breach of judicial duty."); Patterson v. Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, 215 Conn. 553, 567, 577 A.2d 701, 708 (1990) (judge disciplined for purchasing property from a probate estate that his court adjudicated) ("Scienter is not essential for the occurrence of an ethical violation."); and In re Neely, 178 W.Va. 722, 727, 364 S.E.2d 250, 255 (1987) (judge disciplined for requiring his staff to perform personal errands, despite his contention that his actions were proper).

Even statutes that include a mens rea requirement of "knowing" or "willful" conduct require only that the defendant have knowledge that he is engaging in the conduct (i.e., the sending of a letter soliciting participation in a charitable fundraising event), not knowledge that such conduct violates a rule. See, e.g., In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Gustafson, 305 Or. 655, 660, 756 P.2d 21, 24 (Or. 1988) ("...a judge's conduct is 'wilful'(sic) ... if the judge intends to cause a result or take an action contrary to the applicable rule and if he is aware of circumstances that in fact make the rule applicable, whether or not the judge knows that he violates the rule."); In re Barr, 1998 Tex. LEXIS 34, *31 (Tex. 1998) ("Respondent is susceptible to discipline for 'willful' violations of [judicial canons] ... as long as he intended to engage in conduct for which he is disciplined, whether or not he formed the specific intent to violate those canons."); In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183, 690 A.2d 865, 878 (Conn. 1997) ("A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful (sic) violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which he is sanctioned 'whether or not [he] knows that he violates the rule' ... To require that a judge subjectively have known that his conduct was in violation of the canons of judicial conduct would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discipline a judge ... for violating those canons.") (internal citations omitted). U.S. v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1439 (M.D. Pa. 1994) ("'General intent' is defined as '[I]n criminal law, the intent to do that which the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the precise result which eventuated.'") (internal citation omitted); State v. Danforth, 125 Wis.2d 293, 295, 371 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("Intent is an element of a crime only if it is required by statute ... [The child abuse statute] requires only the intent to do the act that causes injury; the resulting injury itself need not be intended.") (internal citation omitted); and People v. Lonergan, 219 Cal.App.3d 82, 95, 267 Cal.Rptr. 887, 895-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("It is well settled that the requirement of acting 'knowingly' is satisfied when the person committing the act has knowledge of the facts although not of the law. 'Knowingly' does not require knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act itself.") (internal citations omitted).

The Opinion in Support of the Order of Dismissal would have the result of imposing a lower standard of culpability for judicial officers than for laypersons - a result we find unacceptable. Ignorance of the law will not excuse a defendant who has sufficient notice of a crime. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 243, 2 L.Ed.2d 228.

In this case, Respondent had ample notice of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of District Justices. Respondent intended to write the solicitation letter. Therefore, regardless of Respondent's lack of malicious intent, sending the letter constituted a violation of Rule 11. Respondent's conduct after sending the letter was admirable, and might well be a basis for this Court to conclude after a hearing on the subject that no sanction is necessary; however, the Board has proven that Respondent has violated Rule 11, a conclusion which Respondent, to his credit, does not contest.

1. The facts as stipulated by the parties and as found by this Court are sufficient to satisfy the Board's burden of proving that Respondent violated Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of District Justices.