IN RE:
		:
	Gigi Sullivan,	:	No. 3 JD 01
	Former District Justice In and For	:
	Magisterial District 05-3-03	:

AND NOW, this 30th day of August, 2002, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Court's Opinion dated April 1, 2002, having become final pursuant to C.J.D.R.P. No. 503, and after the hearing held by the full Court on August 26, 2002 on the issue of sanctions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Gigi Sullivan, is removed from office and shall be ineligible to hold judicial office in the future.¹

It has been contended in other cases that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to discipline a judge ends when the judge's judicial service ends. See Matter of Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988); Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294 (1987). The Supreme Court rejected this argument in both cases for the reason that "once instituted, our jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings is thus only at an end when we issue a final order." These holdings of the Supreme Court were followed by this Court in In re Larsen, 717 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 1998) and In re Cicchetti, 697 A.2d 297, 301, n.1 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 1997).

The Court notes that in Glancey and Snyder, as well as in Larsen and Cicchetti, although sanctions in those cases were imposed after the judicial officer's tenure in office had ended, the disciplinary proceedings in those cases were commenced at a time when those judicial officers still held their judicial offices; whereas, in this case the Respondent did not even receive notification of an investigation by the Judicial Conduct Board until July 6, 2001 - well after her judicial service was terminated. In these circumstances it has been argued that the application of Snyder and Glancey should be limited to cases where disciplinary action is commenced at a time when the judicial officer was still in office and that those cases merely provide for a continuation of such jurisdiction after judicial tenure has terminated. See In re Chesna, 659 A.2d 1091 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 1995). In that case this Court recognized that Glancey and Snyder were distinguishable, for, in Chesna, as here, the Respondent was not even informed of an investigation by the Judicial Conduct Board until well after he left office. We reiterate here what we said in Chesna on the question:

We agree that this case is factually distinguishable, but cannot conclude that this distinction affects the jurisdiction of this Court. In its holding in Snyder, Chief Justice Nix, writing for a majority of our Supreme Court, noted that [T]he people have entrusted to this Court the task of finally determining whether a judge should be disciplined, and, if so, the extent of that discipline and its consequences. Those consequences are not necessarily restricted to the term for which the judge has been elected or retained when he engages in improprieties which require discipline. Snyder at 152, 523 A.2d at 299. In adopting the 1993 amendment, the people have constitutionally transferred that task to this Court. Although charges were not brought until well after Chesna left office, a conclusion that this Court lacked jurisdiction to impose an appropriate sanction would result in exactly the same type of evil sought to be avoided by the rationale of Snyder and its progeny, i.e., avoidance of discipline by resignation prior to charges being brought. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Atty., 528 Pa. 83, 94, 595 A.2d 42, 47 (1991), our Supreme Court held that [The former] JIRB's authority to investigate allegations of misconduct concerning members of the judiciary is not restricted to conduct of a judge in his official capacity. Nor is JIRB's jurisdiction limited by the status of the judicial officer at the time the misconduct occurred or at the time the investigation into it has culminated. (emphasis added). It is not of record before this Court at what point in time the former J.I.R.B. received its initial complaint in this matter and commenced an investigation, [nor is it in this case] nor is it relevant. What is relevant is that the actions alleged by the Board occurred while Chesna occupied his judicial office. Accordingly, we hold that this Court properly has jurisdiction over respondent for the acts alleged by the Judicial Conduct Board. In re Chesna, supra, at 1092-93.

So, too, does this Court have jurisdiction in this case since the conduct at issue here took place while this Respondent occupied her judicial office.